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A previous study (Kilian et al., 2003) had demonstrated that bottlenose dolphins can dis-
criminate visual stimuli differing in numerosity. The aim of the present study was twofold:
first, we sought to determine if dolphins are able to use a numerical category based on
“few” vs. “many” when discriminating stimuli according to the number of their constituent
patterns. Second, we aimed to extend the previously demonstrated range of numbers,
thereby testing the limits of the numerical abilities of bottlenose dolphins.To this end, one
adult bottlenose dolphin learned to discriminate between two simultaneously presented
stimuli which varied in the number of elements they contained. After initial training, several
confounding parameters were excluded to render it likely that discrimination performance
indeed depended on numerosity. Subsequently, the animal was tested with new stimuli
of intermediate as well as higher numbers of elements. Once discrimination had been
achieved, a reversal-training on a subset of stimuli was initiated. Afterward, the subject
generalized the reversal successful to new and unreinforced stimuli. Our results reveal
two main findings: firstly, our data strongly suggest a magnitude and a distance effect.
Thus, coding of numerical information in dolphins might follow logarithmic scaling as pos-
tulated by the Weber-Fechner law. Secondly, after learning a reversal of contingencies, the
dolphin generalized the reversal successful to new and unreinforced stimuli. Thus, within
the limits of a study that was conducted with a single individual, our results suggest that
dolphins are able to learn and use a numerical category that is based on abstract qualities
of “few” vs. “many.”
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INTRODUCTION
The visual world comes in a bewildering variety of shapes and
colors. Since it is impossible to learn the relevant properties of
each object one by one, humans and other animals have devel-
oped the ability to group stimuli along several dimensions (e.g.,
Herrnstein and Loveland, 1964; Delius et al., 2000; Makino and
Jitsumori, 2007). Usually, members of a category are grouped
on the basis of physical similarities. Behaviorally, a category is
defined by an ability to generalize within a class of stimuli and
to discriminate between classes (Keller and Schoenfeld, 1950), as
well as to extrapolate the categorical knowledge to new members
of the stimulus class (Wasserman et al., 1988). To date, a large
number of demonstrations of successful categorizations in non-
human animals have been published. However, in most of these
studies performance could simply be based on “categorization by
rote” (Vaughan and Greene, 1984; Yamazaki et al., 2007) without
requiring an understanding of the abstract relation between the
categorized stimuli.
Some methods have been proposed to be critical for proving
the establishment of a flexible and abstract relation between stim-
ulus classes (e.g., Astley and Wasserman, 1998). One important
technique is the discrimination reversal procedure. It was first
proposed by Lea (1984) in order to show concept discriminations,
and has since been used in a variety of experiments (e.g., Vaughan,
1988;Von Fersen and Lea,1990; Delius et al., 1995,2000), including
one which tested a dolphin with auditory stimuli (von Fersen and
Delius, 2000). Using a discrimination reversal procedure permits
testing whether the subject associates all members of a category
even if these members have no common physical property. In
a standard reversal procedure, the subject is first trained to dis-
criminate between members from two different categories in a
simultaneous discrimination task. After mastering the discrimi-
nation, the trained contingencies are reversed in a subset of the
employed stimuli. Thus, responses which previously led to rein-
forcement are now punished, and vice versa. After again reaching
discrimination criterion, the new contingency is tested with the
remaining members of a group. If the subject spontaneously trans-
poses the reversed contingency to these remaining patterns, it is
likely that the animal is able to categorize the members dependent
on associations within a category.
Kilian et al. (2003) have previously reported a bottlenose dol-
phin to be able to discriminate among visual patterns differing
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in numerosity, i.e., a stimulus property defined by the number of
discriminable elements contained in the stimulus. Although it is
very likely that dolphins were able to use numerosity to discrim-
inate between different patterns in this experiment, it is not clear
if they indeed used a more abstract category based on “few” vs.
“many.” Therefore, the present experiment was designed to test
for the presence of such an abstract relation when performing a
numerical discrimination task. Additionally, we aimed to extend
the previously demonstrated range of numbers (1–6) to a larger
range (1–10) in order to define the limit of a bottlenose dolphin’s
numerical discrimination abilities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The subject of the present study was an experimentally naive
male bottlenose dolphin. At the start of the investigation “Blue”
was 10-years old and from birth on almost blind on his right
eye. He was housed together with four other bottlenose dolphins
in a 13.5 m × 28 m outdoor pool of 4.5 m depth in Marineland
Majorca (Spain). The experiments took place in an adjacent pool
of 4.45 m × 5.70 m × 1.80 m (w × l × d) in which he was separated
from the others during each session.
GENERAL PROCEDURE
The animal had to discriminate between simultaneously displayed
stimuli representing “few” and “many” elements (Figure 1A). The
stimuli consisted of 25cm× 25 cm white PVC boards with black
items stuck onto them. Each stimulus was inserted in a square-
shaped window located on a white painted wooden panel of 1 m2.
A push with the dolphin’s beak could flip the stimulus backward
(Figure 1B). The stimuli were positioned to the left and to the
right of the experimenter. The distance between the two panels
was 1.50 m. During the discrimination process the experimenter
was hidden from the subject’s view by means of a plastic cur-
tain. Each trial started with the animal being positioned at the
tip of a 2.50 m target, above water level, and facing the appara-
tus (Figure 1A). After positioning the animal, the experimenter
revealed the covered stimuli and 4 s later indicated by a short
whistle that the subject had to leave the target to touch one
of the displayed stimuli with its rostrum. Only responses which
tipped either stimulus backward were recorded. Correct responses
were followed by a continuous whistle blow and reinforced with
fish. Incorrect choices were indicated by non-continuous whistle
blows and directly followed by correction trials. The position of
the correct stimulus (left or right) was alternated quasi-randomly
(Gellermann, 1933). The subject was presented with one to two
daily sessions of 20 trials each. The only exceptions were the very
first presentations of new number pairs, for which a session con-
sisted of 10 trials only to minimize frustration. Criterion was
reached after achieving 85% correct performance within a given
session.
PRE-TEST AND HABITUATION PHASE
Prior to starting the actual experiment,“Blue”received some habit-
uation training with the apparatus. He learned to be sent and wait
at the target until the starting signal was given, and then to swim
back and touch one of the two white panels. During five sessions of
20 trials each, he was rewarded irrespective of the side the panel he
FIGURE 1 | (A) Overview of the testing situation with the apparatus, the
stationing device, and the position of the dolphin facing the revealed
stimuli; (B) Blue touching one of the displayed stimuli with his rostrum.
touched was on. This was done to test for a possible side preference.
Subsequently, Blue was tested for a possible preference for “few”
or “many” items, again in five sessions of 20 trials. To this end,
the panels containing few or many items were alternated quasi-
randomly, and “Blue” was rewarded after each choice irrespective
of which stimulus he had chosen.
EXPERIMENT 1
TRAINING PHASE
During training sessions, the animal learned to discriminate 1 vs. 5
and was rewarded for choosing the stimuli which contained more
elements. The stimuli consisted of black circles (r = 2.4 cm). After
reaching 85% correct performance, this stimulus pair was used to
habituate “Blue” to unreinforced trials (catch trials). Subsequently,
he was trained with the following number pairs: 1 vs. 4, 1 vs. 3, and
1 vs. 2. After successful performance, the animal was also trained
with stimulus pairs varying in surface, shape, and element patterns,
whereby two different conditions were conducted for the variable
“surface”: (1) single items with the same surface, and (2) items
having the same overall surface. For “shape,” the initial circles were
substituted for triangles. In order to create different “patterns,” the
elements were organized in different arrangements (Figure 2A).
For each condition (surface, shape, and pattern), five sessions were
run, each of which included six catch trials. We did not balance or
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Examples of the stimulus pair 1 vs. 5 with variations of
surface, size, shape, and pattern of elements. Similar conditions were also
used for 1 vs. 4, 1 vs. 3, and 1 vs. 2; (B) examples of control stimuli for 1
vs. 5. Similar conditions were presented for 1 vs. 4, 1 vs. 3, and 1 vs. 2.
systematically vary the perimeter of the stimuli, but ensured that
in our stimulus set, the overall perimeter was sometimes longer or
shorter on the rewarded panel. For example, the perimeters of a
single triangle vs. two circles were 27.57 and 30.16 cm, respectively,
in one set of panels and 39 and 30.16 cm, respectively, in another.
CONTROL PHASE
During control sessions, new stimulus pairs were introduced, mix-
ing the shapes of the elements (circle, triangle, square) for the two
panels representing “few” and “many.” Furthermore, variations of
up to 100% regarding the size of the elements were introduced
(Figure 2B). In a given session, 16 familiar stimulus pairs were
mixed with four novel pairs which were never reinforced (catch
trials). Moreover, two familiar stimulus pairs were also not rein-
forced in order to prevent novelty to be exclusively associated with
no reward. During this procedure,“Blue”was only confronted with
the familiar number combinations of the training phase (1 vs. 5, 1
vs. 4, 1 vs. 3, and 1 vs. 2). He always had to choose the panel con-
taining more elements. These elements could be either circles or
triangles or squares, and the total surface of the elements could be
the same, smaller, or bigger than for the panel representing “few”
elements. In total, 10 sessions were run and 40 new unreinforced
stimuli pairs were introduced. Criterion was reached after 85%
correct performance had been achieved.
TESTING PHASE
During the testing phase, new number pairs with new numerosi-
ties (2 vs. 5, 3 vs. 5, 2 vs. 4, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs. 5, 5 vs. 6, 5 vs. 7, 5 vs.
9, and 5 vs. 10) were introduced, mixed with training and control
stimuli, and tested without feedback (catch trials). As in the con-
trol phase, a session consisted of four new number combinations
and 16 familiar stimuli of which two were also not reinforced. For
each new number pair, five sessions were conducted, and again,
variations concerning the shape, size, and pattern were presented.
In this phase, we also used outlined and filled elements. In addi-
tion, different shapes and sizes were mixed on one panel. Accuracy
criterion was again set to 85% correct answers during one session.
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 1
Pre-test
Blue showed a clear preference for the left side, choosing left in
70% of trials. When being confronted with panels showing “few”
or “many” items that alternated between left and right, he contin-
ued to swim left, this time even in 96% of cases. No spontaneous
preference for “few” (52%) or “many” elements (48%) could be
detected.
Training phase
For the first training pair (1 vs. 5), the subject needed 13 sessions
to reach criterion. His performance remained stable even after
introducing catch trials. For the following training pairs (1 vs. 4,
1 vs. 3, 1 vs. 2), criterion was already reached in the first session.
Performance levels remained constant also for pattern, shape, and
size variations (Figure 3).
Control phase
Blue’s performance for variations of shape, pattern, and surface
size was above the criterion level for all conditions (Figure 4).
Testing phase
Blue’s performance for the new and untrained stimuli (Figure 5)
2 vs. 5 was 90%. For 2 vs. 4, he reached 95%, and for 3 vs. 5, 2 vs.
3, 3 vs. 4, and 4 vs. 5 85%. For the combinations 5 vs. 6 (65%), 5
vs. 7 (50%), and 5 vs. 9 (70%), Blue failed to reach criterion. For 5
vs. 10, the criterion was (85%; Figure 6).
DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT 1
The aim of the first experiment was two replicate the results of Kil-
ian et al. (2003), and to test if the numerical range of the previous
study (1–6) can be extended to 1–10. Our results clearly replicate
Kilian et al. (2003) and demonstrate that numerical competence
is in the reach of bottlenose dolphins. Our results are largely in
line with a previous study (Mitchell et al., 1985) which showed
that a dolphin could choose correctly among the number of fish
on a scale from 0 to 5. However, in the study by Mitchell et al.
(1985), numerosity was confounded by the amount of food, and
the subject could just have perceived the objects as representing
hedonic values rather than members of an ordinal series.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) For the first stimulus pair 1:5, the subject needed 13
sessions to reach criterion. His performance remained stable even after the
introduction of catch trials. (B) For the following numerosities, criterion was
already reached in the first sessions.
FIGURE 4 |The results of the control phase show that the animal could
transfer the learned performance to new and unreinforced stimuli.
At the beginning of the experiments, Blue demonstrated a
preference for the left side, possibly due to his right eye being
almost blind. A tendency to shift to the sighted side is well known
under monocular vision (Ulrich et al., 1999). Blue’s side preference
disappeared after being rewarded for selecting the “many” pat-
terns. Overall, Blue’s performance did not appear to be influenced
by confounding stimuli like surface, shape, and element patterns.
The importance of controlling these factors has been described
in several studies on numerical abilities using various species like
dolphins (Kilian et al., 2003), pigeons (Emmerton et al., 1997; Xia
et al., 2001), monkeys (Cantlon and Brannon, 2007), newborn
chicks (Rugani et al., 2011), and human infants (Strauss and Cur-
tis, 1981; Clearfield and Mix, 1999, 2001). These results suggest
FIGURE 5 | Examples for the testing stimuli 2 vs. 5. Similar variations
were prepared for the stimuli 3 vs. 5, 3 vs. 5, 2 vs. 4, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 4 vs.
5, 5 vs. 6, 5 vs. 7, 5 vs. 9, and 5 vs. 10.
FIGURE 6 |The figure indicates the larger number within each pair as
well as the difference between this pair of stimuli. The number within
the circles indicates the achieved performance of Blue. The data show that
Blue had more difficulties in discriminating higher numerosities with small
differences between the two numbers.
that, if available, animals including humans may rely on vari-
ables that are simpler and therefore less effortful than numerosity
(Davis and Memmott, 1982; Beran, 2007). Consequently, Davis
and Pérusse (1988) argued that numerosity is the last cognitive
resort if other means fail. Along with data from other species
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(Brannon and Terrace, 1998; Boysen and Hallberg,2000; Brannon,
2006; Cantlon and Brannon, 2007; Vallortigara et al., 2010), our
data clearly argue against this notion, since Blue seemed to spon-
taneously use numerosity even though other cues were initially
available.
This interpretation could also explain why Blue was so rapidly
able to generalize to other numerical examples during the con-
trol phase without loss of performance (Figure 4). Similar results
regarding a transfer to heterogeneous stimulus sets were also found
for other animals such as pigeons (Emmerton et al., 1997), a gray
parrot (Pepperberg, 1987), a Californian Sea lion (Dieckmann,
1999), rhesus monkeys (Brannon and Terrace, 1998), rats (Suzuki
and Kobayashi, 2000), and hooded crows (Smirnova et al., 2000).
In the very beginning of the task, Blue could have relied on a
strategy to avoid 1. However, the fact that he worked above thresh-
old when being confronted with panels that did not contain the
element “1” renders it likely that Blue grasped numerosity as the
essence of the task very early on. At least at the present state of
analysis of a single subject, our results indicate that for dolphins,
numerosity could be a cue that is available before experimental
onset (Hauser et al., 2002; Hyde, 2011). In this sense, Blue could
reveal a “number sense” (Dehaene et al., 1998).
This last interpretation contrasts with the data of Kilian et al.
(2003) who reported Noah, their subject, to completely rely on
non-numerical cues in the beginning of the experiment. Although
the difference between Blue and Noah could be ascribed to inter-
individual differences, other interpretations are also conceivable.
Kilian et al. (2003) used three dimensional stimuli consisting of
diverse objects in different numbers hanging into water. Noah had
to swim from a distance of 10 m and indicate his choice by touch-
ing one of the objects. Thus, Noah was confronted with stimuli
which provided cues that could be discerned by visual and auditory
senses. Additionally, Noah could utilize motion parallax, shape and
depth cues, whereas Blue could only use two dimensional vision.
It is possible that the comparably more frugal stimulus repertoire
of the present study made the spontaneous use of numerosity cues
more likely. Thus, dolphins appear to be able to apply a concept of
numerosity very early on when encountering stimuli if other cues
are less salient. Similar results were obtained by Beran (2007) who
tested the influence of non-numerical cues in rhesus monkeys, and
by Agrillo et al. (2009) who studied mosquito fish in a 2 vs. 3 object
discrimination task, also probing the influence of non-numerical
parameters.
Within the limitations of a study conducted with a single ani-
mal, the present data suggest that bottlenose dolphins are able
to categorize numerosities up to 10. The next experiment was
designed as a reversal task in order to test if Blue was able to
process a more abstract relation of “few” vs. “many.” According to
some authors (Lea, 1984), successful transfer of reversed contin-
gencies to items that were never reversed requires the existence of
intra-categorical associations and could even be seen as evidence
for a true numerosity concept.
EXPERIMENT 2
REVERSAL PHASE
To evaluate whether Blue indeed had acquired associative bonds
between single numerical elements, the animal was confronted
with a reversed S+, thus having to decide in favor of the panel
with the “few” element. For this purpose, Blue was successively
trained with only two numerical combinations: 1 vs. 4 and 1 vs. 5.
Blue was already familiar with these numerical combinations from
the initial training phase, but this time, reinforcement was deliv-
ered after choosing the panel with “1.” After reaching the criterion
of 85% correct performance, catch trials with other numerical
combinations (1 vs. 3, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 3 vs. 6) were intermixed
with the two training pairs. The procedure of this phase was the
same as described for the test phase. Note that because of poor
performance of the number pairing 3 vs. 4 (see Results), the sub-
ject received additional training sessions with the training pair 1
vs. 4 and 1 vs. 5 before the combination 3 vs. 6 was tested.
RESULTS
Blue needed eleven sessions to reach criterion for the first reversal
stimuli 1 vs. 5. The performance after the introduction of catch tri-
als initially dropped to 80%, but recovered in the next session and
remained constant for the following sessions. Blue reached the cri-
terion for the reversal stimuli 1 vs. 4 already in the second session,
and the animal’s performance was constant after the introduction
of catch trials (Figure 7).
Over five sessions, Blue reached 100% correct answers for 1 vs.
3. For the combination 2 vs. 3, he reached 85%, whereby the first
four catch trials of the first session were correct. For the stimulus
pairing 3 vs. 4, he failed to reach criterion (75% correct perfor-
mance). For the last number combination 3 vs. 6, Blue reached
90% correct performance (Figure 8).
DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENT 2
The second experiment was designed to test if Blue had already
acquired strong intra-categorical associations. As argued by several
authors (Lea, 1984; Herrnstein, 1990), members of a category or
concept are bound together independent of their perceptual sim-
ilarities. Thus, contingencies applied to one stimulus of a class
should be transferred to all other members. Indeed, Blue was
highly successful in this transfer. His performance dropped to
75% only for 3 vs. 4, possibly due to the operations of the analog
FIGURE 7 | Blue reached the criterion for the first reversal-training of 1
vs. 5 (85% correct choices) after 11 sessions, and in the following
session the introduction of catch trials started. In the next session,
performance dropped to 80% but recovered quickly. For the subsequently
introduced training pair 1 vs. 4, criterion was already reached in the second
session, and performance remained constant even after the introduction of
catch trials.
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FIGURE 8 | Blue’s performance for the reversal contingencies 1 vs. 3, 2
vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, and 3 vs. 6. Only for the stimuli pair 3 vs. 4 did Blue’s
performance not reach criterion (75%), albeit his acquisition clearly was
above chance level.
magnitude system that is subject to a ratio limit in accordance
with the Weber-Fechner law (Fechner, 1888; Agrillo et al., 2012).
Thus, a simple stimulus generalization can be excluded, since Blue
could base his decision only on abstract qualities (few/more). As a
further control, we had used new stimuli for the reversal transfer,
with a different arrangement of items compared to the first part
of the experiment. The possibility that Blue based his decisions on
a response outcome is also unlikely, as all new stimuli were intro-
duced by catch trials. Thus, we can also exclude new learning by
feedback.
Taken together, the dolphin of the present study demonstrated
its capacity to reverse all numerical comparisons after being
trained for reversal with only two numerical distinctions. Our
results contrast with the results of other authors who reported the
necessity of large amounts of training stimuli in non-human ani-
mals for developing an abstract concept (Roitblat and von Fersen,
1992; Zentall et al., 2002; Fabre-Thorpe, 2003). Independent of
this, we are inclined to conclude that an abstract representation of
“few” vs. “many” is within the reach of dolphins.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In the present work, we examined whether a bottlenose dolphin
could rely on a numerical understanding of “few” vs. “many.” Sim-
ilar to Kilian et al. (2003), we carefully excluded several confound-
ing factors, i.e., that the subject was cued by physical properties of
the stimuli other than numerosity. Blue immediately transferred
learned contingencies to novel numerical combinations. Data sug-
gest that he likely made the use of a parallel subitizing and an
analog magnitude system. Moreover, he was able to reverse the
remaining stimulus sets after being exposed to only two number
pairings without being taught to do so. Such immediate rever-
sal of performance strongly suggests an abstract understanding
of “few” vs. “more” and could even be considered as evidence
for a numerosity concept (Lea, 1984). Bottlenose dolphins often
aggregate in “super – alliances.” Here, subgroups of males join
temporally in order to get numerical advantage over another
group to gain access to a receptive female (Hauser, 2000; Con-
nor et al., 2001). Thus, an understanding of magnitude could be
of advantage to dolphins living in the wild. In the following, we
will discuss the present data in a more general framework.
For magnitudes up to three, Blue could readily discriminate
between numerosities that differed by one. Beyond that, his perfor-
mance started to deteriorate and was just at criterion in experiment
1 or slightly below in experiment 2. This is typical for a “parallel”
or subitizing system that only works for small sets up to 3 or 4.
Usually, reaction time curves of human subjects that having to
judge the number of dots within briefly flashed displays show a
monotonic increase with an increase in dot numbers. However,
the slopes of these curves display a distinct change at around 3–4
items, for which a fast subitizing process is thought to be succeeded
by a true counting mechanism (Trick and Pylyshyn, 1993; Lemer
et al., 2003). Below 4, subjects usually accurately discriminate dot
numbers despite only brief presentation times and when the ratio
of the two numbers is smaller than 1:2.
When being confronted with numerosities beyond 3 or 4,
animals seem to process numerical comparisons logarithmically.
Indeed, Nieder and Miller (2003) showed that in monkeys, the
coding of numerical information follows logarithmic scaling as
postulated by the Weber-Fechner law. Thus, with pairings of higher
numbers but constant absolute difference, the relative difference
becomes smaller and is therefore more difficult to discriminate.
Numerous investigations in human infants (Strauss and Curtis,
1981; Xu and Spelke, 2000), human adults (Xu, 2003; Piazza et al.,
2004; Hyde and Spelke, 2008; Cordes and Brannon, 2009; Schmitt
and Fischer, 2011), human adults with few number words (see
citation inside of Brannon, 2006), other primates (Thomas et al.,
1980; Boysen, 1993; Boysen and Hallberg, 2000; Smith et al., 2003;
Brannon, 2006; Jordan and Brannon, 2006; van Marle et al., 2006;
Addessi et al., 2007; Beran, 2007; Cantlon and Brannon, 2007;
Hanus and Call, 2007; Nieder and Merten, 2007; Beran et al.,
2008), pigeons (Scarf et al., 2012), New Zealand robins (Hunt
et al., 2008), and domestic chicks (Rugani et al., 2008) show similar
results. Agrillo et al. (2012) observed this distinction in comparable
ways in undergraduate students and guppies, and argued for the
existence of two numerical systems that have a long phylogenetic
history. However, the existence of two systems is not undisputed.
Some authors present evidence that most experimental data can
be explained by a single magnitude system (Nieder, 2005; Nieder
and Merten, 2007). Alternatively, subitizing could mainly occur in
studies in which subjects use behavioral discriminations by access-
ing implicit representations of the number of objects (Hauser et al.,
2000).
We set out to study if numerosity in dolphins is represented as
a flexible and abstract category representing the more or the less
of a magnitude. To this end, we employed the partial reversal pro-
cedure in which only a subset of numerosities is reversed and the
remainders are subsequently tested. According to Lea (1984) and
Herrnstein (1990), successful partial reversal can signal the pres-
ence of a numerosity concept. Indeed, Blue successfully switched
his choices after single reversal learning. Thus, within the limits a
study conducted with only a single individual, we are inclined to
believe that bottlenose dolphins can flexible represent numerosity
as an abstract magnitude system. This result is similar to another
dolphin study in which two dolphins were shown to categorize
“same” vs. “different” for different visual objects (Mercado et al.,
2000). Numerical competence at a level similar to Blue has previ-
ously also been shown for monkeys and parrots (Matsuzawa, 1985;
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Pepperberg, 1987). A successful mastery of abstract category use in
monkeys was described by Bovet and Vauclair (2001). In this study,
animals had to judge two objects as same or different and after-
ward transfer their learned skills to new objects which belonged
to two functional categories (food/non-food). Other examples are
provided by flexible token use in capuchin monkeys as described
by Addessi et al. (2007), or by achievement of abstract relations
like “inside-outside” (Herrnstein et al., 1989). The parallel results
of cognitive capacities of dolphins and primates, other mammals
and birds despite their different evolutionary history and ecology
reveal that vertebrates uses the same basic and evolutionary old
processes when flexibly dealing with categories (Mercado et al.,
2000). Results like these argue in favor of a continuous evolu-
tionary process of cognitive competences, an evolutionary process
for which humans represent an integral part of the overall pat-
tern (Vauclair, 2002; Pepperberg and Gordon, 2005; Diester and
Nieder, 2007).
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